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This paper surveys the literature dealing with the thesis put forward by Dooley, Folkerts-
Landau  and Garber  (DFG) that the present constellation of global exchange-rate 
arrangements constitutes a revived Bretton-Woods  regime. DFG also argue that the 
revived regime will be sustainable, despite its large global imbalances. While much of the 
literature generated by DFG’s thesis points to specific differences between the earlier 
regime and revived regime that render the latter unstable, we argue that an underlying 
similarity between the two regimes renders the revived regime unstable. Specifically, to 
the extent that the present system constitutes a revived Bretton-Woods system, it is 
vulnerable to the same set of destabilizing forces -- including asset price bubbles and 
global financial crises -- that marked the latter years of the earlier regime, leading to its 
breakdown. We extend the Markov switching model to examine the relation between 
global liquidity and commodity prices. We find evidence of commodity-price bubbles in 
both the latter stages of the earlier Bretton-Woods regime and the revived regime. 
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There is also the consideration that politicians and officials are, on the basis of all previous 
experience, incapable of thinking about long-range problems unless either a crisis has already 
come upon them or a major war has prevented them from pursuing short-run victories over each 
other and obliged them to think about long-range problems as a relief from the boredom of 
enforced political inactivity. That consideration alone guarantees us another international 




Harry G. Johnson (1973, pp. 437-38) 
1. Introduction 
What kind of exchange-rate arrangement characterises the current international 
monetary system? Although the exchange rates of many of the major currencies -  - 
including the U.S. dollar, the euro, the yen, and the pound sterling - - float against each 
other, the currencies of many Asian emerging-market economies and oil-exporting 
economies are pegged to the U.S. dollar. This circumstance has provoked a series of 
articles by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (hereafter DFG),  who argue that the 
present constellation of global exchange-rate arrangements constitutes a revived Bretton-
Woods, or Bretton-Woods II, regime.
1 As was the situation under the Bretton-Woods I 
regime, which was an arrangement formally agreed among the participants during the 
period from the mid-1940s until the early-1970s, DFG posit that the United States serves 
the role of asymmetric center  of the current  regime, running current-account  deficits, 
providing global (U.S. dollar) liquidity, and absorbing exports from the rest of the world. 
In the earlier Bretton-Woods regime, Japan and the countries of Western Europe formed a 
periphery with the United States at the center of the international monetary system. The 
periphery maintained undervalued, pegged exchange rates and accumulated large amounts 
of U.S. dollar-denominated reserves in the pursuit of export-led growth. In the Bretton-
Woods II regime, the emerging-market economies of Asia, including China, largely serve 
as dollar peggers and dollar accumulators.
2 The Bretton-Woods I regime lasted for about a 
quarter of a century. DFG have argued that the present system, despite its large global 
imbalances, will also be sustainable.
3
                                                 
1 See DFG (2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005, 2006, 2009). See, also, Dooley and Garber (2005a, 2005b). 
 
2 DFG (2003, p. 5) included China, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan in the group 
comprising the new periphery. 
3 DFG (2005) stated that the current regime would last for another 10 years (from the mid-2000s). They also 
put forward the view that, at some point in the future, the regime will metamorphosise into a Bretton-Woods 
III regime as a new group of countries graduate to the periphery. Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008) 
also stressed the sustainability of the mid-2000s’ regime.   2 
Many commentators (e.g., Eichengreen (2004, 2007), Roubini (2006), Hunt (2008)) 
have accepted the broad thrust of DFG’s thesis, but point to specific differences (discussed 
in Section 4) between the earlier and present Bretton-Woods regimes which they believe 
renders the current regime structurally unstable. We argue that an underlying similarity 
between the earlier regime, especially as it is evolved in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
and the current regime  renders the latter regime  vulnerable to asset-price booms and 
financial crises. That is, we argue that, to the extent that the current regime constitutes a 
revived Bretton-Woods regime, it is vulnerable to the same set of destabilizing forces - - 
including asset-price bubbles and global financial crises - - that led to the breakdown of 
the earlier regime. In this connection, we argue that actions by the Federal Reserve and the 
U.S. government in the late 1960s and early 1970s to demonetise gold at the margin 
marked a structural  change in the earlier Bretton-Woods regime, leaving  the global 
financial system without an anchor to restrict  the creation of international liquidity. 
Specifically, actions to remove the requirement making the dollar convertible into gold (at 
a fixed price) eliminated any disciple on U.S. monetary policy. These actions set the stage 
for an explosion of international liquidity in the early 1970s, culminating in a commodity-
price bubble and a major exchange-rate crisis and leading to the collapse of the earlier 
Bretton-Woods  regime.
4
The remainder of this paper consists of six  sections. Section 2 outlines key 
characteristics of the original Bretton-Woods  regime,  circa  the mid-1940s until its 
collapse in 1973. Section 3 describes the central features of the revived Bretton-Woods 
thesis put forward by DFG. Section 4 provides an overview of the literature that has 
emerged in reaction to the DFG thesis. Section 5 discusses the relation between global-
liquidity creation and asset-price booms under both Bretton-Woods regimes. Section 6 
provides a formal test of regime-switching behavior; in particular, we investigate whether 
the period marking the latter stages of the earlier Bretton-Woods regime and the period 
marking the revived regime exhibited similar bubble-like behavior in commodity prices. 
Section 7 concludes. 
  The absence of a convertibility requirement on the anchor 
currency has carried over to the revived Bretton-Woods regime of the 2000s. That regime 
has also been marked by a sharp expansion of global liquidity, asset-price bubbles, and a 
major financial crisis. 
                                                 
4  Commodities comprise an asset class and are also used as inputs into production. On the use of 
commodities as an investment vehicle, see Mongars and Marchal-Dombrat (2006)   3 
2.  Bretton-Woods I, Revisited 
A monetary regime can be defined as a set of monetary arrangements and 
institutions that constrains the ability of the monetary authorities to influence the evolution 
of the macroeconomic aggregates (Bordo and Schwartz, 1997, p. 1; Eichengreen and 
Temin, 2010, p. 4). Regimes have both domestic and international components. The 
domestic component relates to the policy actions and institutional arrangements of the 
monetary authorities. The international component concerns the monetary relations - - 
including exchange-rate arrangements and permittable degree of capital mobility -  - 
among economic entities (Bordo and Schwartz, 1997, p. 2). In what follows, we focus on 
the international component of monetary regimes. 
The regime that was agreed at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944 had 
several major objectives, including the following.
5
•  It sought to avoid the exchange-rate instability of the floating-rate regime of the 
1920s, which was seen as having impeded external adjustment and the post-
World War I reconstruction of trade and finance.
  
6
•  It aimed to prevent a repetition of the beggar-thy-neighbor policies that had 
characterised the latter stages of the interwar gold-exchange standard, during the 
existence of which countries used trade restrictions and competitive currency 
devaluations to increase trade surpluses (or reduce trade deficits) in attempts to 
reduce domestic unemployment, shifting that unemployment to other countries 
(Solomon, 1977, p. 1; Bordo, 1993, p. 35; Cohen, 2002, p. 2).  
  
•  It endeavored to provide autonomy for monetary and fiscal authorities to pursue 
domestic policies targeted at achieving full employment.  
•  It sought to attain symmetric adjustment between those economies with balance-
of-payments surpluses and those with balance-of-payments deficits.  
                                                 
5 The architecture of the system was decided before the Bretton-Woods conference, in negotiations that 
began in 1942 between UK officials and U.S. officials (Kenen, 1993). The following account is based on 
Yeager (1976), Solomon (1977), Meltzer (1991), Bordo (1993), Kenen (1993), McKinnon (1993), Cohen 
(2002), and Eichengreen (2008). 
6 Broadly stated, there were three exchange-rate regimes during the interwar period: (1) general floating 
from 1919 to 1925; (2) the gold exchange standard from 1926 until the early 1930s; and (3) a managed float 
from the early 1930s until 1939 (Bordo, 1993, p. 6). The view that floating exchange rates discourage 
international trade and finance and impede external adjustment gained prominence as a result of Nurske’s 
report (1944) for the League of Nations. Nurske’s view was based mainly on his interpretation of France’s 
experience with flexible exchange rates during the mid-1920s. Nurske’s interpretation of that episode was 
criticised by Friedman (1953).   4 
•  It aimed to achieve symmetric positions among currencies  within the 
international financial regime. 
To help achieve these objectives, a new institution, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), was established and charged with promoting collaboration on international 
monetary issues, facilitating the maintenance of full employment,  maintaining stable 
exchange rates, providing a multilateral payments system,  and  eliminating  exchange 
restrictions, and providing financial assistance to members with  balance-of-payments 
deficits,  thereby  reducing  external disequilibria (Yeager, 1976, pp. 390-91;  Solomon, 
1977, p. 12; Bordo, 1993, pp. 34-35).
7 Each member of the Fund was required to establish 
a par value for its currency in terms of either gold or the U.S. dollar and to maintain the 
market exchange rate of its currency within one percent of the declared par value through 
intervention in the foreign-exchange market by buying and selling the currencies of other 
countries. Instead of the rigid exchange rates of the gold-exchange  standard and the 
floating rates that characterised the mid-1920s, the earlier Bretton-Woods regime featured 
fixed-but-adjustable exchange rates. Parities could be changed with Fund approval if a 
member faced a “fundamental disequilibrium” on its external accounts.
8 Moreover, each 
member of the Fund was expected to make its currency convertible for current-account 
transactions (Solomon, 1977, p. 12; Bordo, 1993, p. 35; Kenen, 1993, p. 235,
 Bordo, and 
Eichengreen,  2008).  Fund members were allowed to use controls on capital-account 
transactions. Controls on the capital account permitted some autonomy for the conduct of 
domestic monetary policy.
9
The system that emerged was considerably different from that which had been 
intended (Bordo, 1993). Instead of a system of equal currencies, the U.S. dollar was the 
center of the system. The U.S. Treasury, which entered the Bretton-Woods period holding 
three-fourths of the global monetary gold stock (Meltzer, 1991), pegged the price of the 
dollar at 35 dollars per ounce of gold, freely buying and selling gold to official bodies at 
that price. Others intervened to keep their currencies within one percent of parity against 
the dollar by buying and selling dollars (Bordo, 1993, pp. 37 and 49). In 1949 a group of 
  
                                                 
7 The Fund’s Articles of Agreement came into effect at the end of 1945. The Fund’s governing body, the 
Board of Governors, first met in March 1946. 
8 The term “fundamental equilibrium” was never defined. The Fund could not disapprove a change in parity, 
however, if the change was less than ten percent (Bordo, 1993, p. 35). 
9 A post-war transitional period was provided during which Fund members could circumvent the ban on 
controls over current-account transactions. Countries maintaining controls for more than five years after the 
start of Fund operations - - that is, beyond 1952 - - were expected to consult with the Fund about them 
annually. See Yeager (1976, p. 391) and Bordo (1993, p. 35).   5 
24 countries devalued their currencies against the dollar; however, exchange-rate 
adjustments among the major currencies became less-frequent over time, reflecting, in 
part, concerns that a devaluation would result in a decline in national prestige and lead to 
competitive devaluations by other countries (Obstfeld, 1993, p. 230).  
For most of the 1950s and the 1960s, major European countries and Japan used 
capital controls to maintain undervalued real exchange rates against the U.S. dollar in the 
pursuit of export-led growth (Meltzer, 1991, p. 87). In turn, for most of the 1950s and the 
1960s, the United States ran balance-of-payments deficits, supplying dollar liquidity to the 
rest of the world.
10
During the late 1960s and early 1970s several events transformed the Bretton-Woods 
I regime from a regime based on the convertibility of the U.S. dollar into gold (at a fixed 
price) to a regime based on fiat money. In this connection, prior to 1958, less than ten 
percent of cumulative U.S. balance-of-payments deficits since the end of World War II 
had been financed through U.S. gold sales; from 1959 until 1968 almost two-thirds of the 
U.S. cumulative balance-of-payments deficits were financed from U.S. gold reserves 
(Cohen, 2002, p.6). When the Bretton-Woods regime started, the United States held about 
three-quarters of the world’s monetary stock (Meltzer, 1991, p.56); by 1968, the share had 
declined to about one-quarter. To preserve its remaining gold stock, the following 
measures were taken to sever the link between the dollar and gold. 
 In this connection, a key characteristic of the system was that the 
United States played the role of world banker; specifically, the United States engaged in 
maturity transformation, providing short-term liquidity services (i.e., borrowing short-
term) and lending long-term to the rest of the world (Despres, Kindleberger and Salant, 
1966).  
•  A run on sterling and the dollar into gold brought a collapse of the gold-pool 
agreement in March 1968. Created in 1961 by eight major countries (Belgium, 
France,  Federal  Germany,  Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States) to stabilise the U.S. dollar price of gold at $35 
an ounce on the London market (the main trading center for gold), the gold pool 
became a key pillar of the Bretton-Woods I regime.
11
                                                 
10 However, from 1959 until 1971, the United States mainly ran current-account surpluses. The absolute size 
of the surpluses began to decline in 1964. In 1968 and 1969 the U.S. had balance-of-payments surpluses, 
reflecting a tightening of Fed policy and ceilings on interest rates on deposits. See Bordo (1993). 
 With the abandonment of 
the gold pool, the price of gold for official transactions remained at $35 per 
11 See Yeager (1976, pp. 425-27) and Eichengreen (2007, Chapter 2).   6 
ounce but the members of the gold pool did not attempt to control the price of 
gold in private transactions; in order to prevent arbitrage between the private and 
official markets for gold, central banks agreed not to sell in the private gold 
market (Meltzer, 1991, p. 63).  
•  In March 1968 the Federal Reserve removed the 25-percent gold backing 
requirement for the issuance of Federal Reserve notes. As Bordo (1993, pp. 70-
72) argued, “the key effect of these [two] arrangements  was that gold was 
demonetised at the margin… In effect, the world switched to a de facto dollar 
standard.”
12
•  Following a sharp rise in the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit in the first quarter 
of 1971 and a resulting run against the U.S. dollar, in August 1971 President 
Richard Nixon ended U.S. gold loss by announcing that the United States would 
no longer sell gold to foreign central banks. This action severed the remaining 
link between the dollar and gold.
   
13
Why did the United States sever the links between the dollar and gold during the late 
1960s and early 1970s? Beginning in the early 1960s, the Federal Reserve implemented 
expansionary monetary policies, which led to rising inflation, declining competitiveness, 
and growing balance-of-payments deficits  (Meltzer, 1991, Bordo, 1993); the Fed’s 
monetary policy “concentrated almost excessively on domestic objectives” (Meltzer, 
1991, p. 79). As foreign central banks accumulated U.S. dollar reserves, the United States 
came under the threat of a convertibility crisis. To address this threat, the U.S. government 
and the Federal Reserve severed all links between the dollar and gold. However, those 
actions transformed the international monetary system from a commodity-based system to 
a fiat-money system. The Bretton-Woods regime was set adrift without an anchor.
 
14
                                                 
12 Similarly, Yeager (1976, p. 575) argued that “with convertibility at an end, the world was on a de facto 
dollar standard rather than a genuine gold-exchange standard.” 
 As a 
result, growth of global liquidity exploded in the early 1970s (Section 5, below) and, in 
early 1973, the  old  regime collapsed, ushering in a new  regime of managed  floating 
exchange rates. 
13  Nixon announced that the suspension of convertibility would be temporary. At the Smithsonian 
Agreement of December 1971, gold was repriced at $38 per ounce but the dollar remained de facto 
inconvertible. Meltzer (1991, p. 80) observed that the action by the U.S. government in August 1971 
“formalised the restriction that had been in effect for more than three years by refusing to sell gold.” 
14 Meltzer (1991, p. 82) noted that “discipline [on the Federal Reserve] was lacking once the de facto 
embargo on gold was in place after March 1968.” Meltzer also pointed out that some of the responsibility for 
the breakdown of the earlier Bretton-Woods regime lied with the periphery countries, which made few 
efforts to adjust their policies.  Bordo (1993, p. 73) argued: “without gold convertibility, there was no 
commitment mechanism to constrain the United Stated to follow a stable monetary policy.   7 
3. Bretton-Woods Revived 
DFG attempted to explain a major paradox within the international financial system 
that emerged in the early 2000s - - namely, that rapidly-growing capital-poor-but-labour-
rich developing economies were exporting capital, on net, to the capital-rich United States. 
To explain this paradox, DFG postulated that sometime during the early-2000s  the 
international-monetary regime metamorphosised into a new Bretton-Woods regime. Two 
developments that occurred during the 2000s form the main backdrop to their thesis. First, 
beginning in the early-2000s an enormous expansion in global liquidity took place; during 
the period 2003  to 2007  global reserves increased  127  percent,  compared with a 33 
percent increase during the preceding five-year period.
15 Moreover, much of the reserve 
accumulation during the latter period was by Asian emerging market economies. Second, 
the large accumulation of reserves was  used  mainly  to finance growing U.S. current 
account deficits.
16
The DFG argument runs as follows. During the late 1980s/early 1990s, with the fall 
of the planned economies, millions of previously unemployed workers joined the world’s 
market economies. This situation created an excess supply of labour that should have 
driven global interest rates upward.
  All other factors held the same, the deficits should have become 
increasingly difficult to finance as the net international investment position of the United 
States declined. With investors becoming increasingly reluctant to invest in U.S.-dollar-
denominated financial instruments, yields and spreads on those instruments would have 
been expected to rise. In fact, however, nominal yields and spreads on dollar-denominated 
instruments fell during the period 1999 through the mid-2000s  (DFG, 2006). What 
accounts for this circumstance? DFG argued that, after the collapse of Bretton-Woods I, 
the structure of the international monetary system came “full circle to its essential Bretton-
Woods era form”, allowing the U.S. current-account deficits to be financed while both 
nominal interest rates and interest-rate spreads on U.S. financial instruments fell (DFG, 
2003, p. 2).  
17
                                                 
15 Reserves are net of gold. The data in the text are from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.  
  To absorb the excess labour, emerging Asian 
economies followed export-led growth strategies based on undervalued real exchange 
rates against the U.S. dollar, similar to the strategies followed by many  European 
16 As a percentage of GDP, the U.S. current-account deficit rose steadily from about 3 percent in 1999 to 6 
percent in 2006; it then fell to 5.3 and 4.6 percent in 2007 and 2008, respectively. Source, IMF World 
Economic Outlook (2009). 
17 All other factors held the same, a rise in the supply of labour increases the marginal productivity of 
capital, causing real interest rates to rise.   8 
countries and Japan under the Bretton-Woods I regime. DFG (2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2005) 
argued that the emerging Asian economies form a new periphery. Under the revived 
Bretton-Woods regime, the new workers were, in the aggregate, large net savers. As a 
result, an enormous increase in saving occurred in emerging Asian economies. Based on 
this circumstance - - that is, a huge increase in the supply of labour that came with an 
enormous rise in saving - - DFG posited that the global economy did not face a problem of 
excess saving. Instead, the global economy faced a problem of an excess supply of labour; 
the export-led growth strategy of the new periphery allowed the countries comprising the 
periphery to experience high growth rates, providing jobs for the previously-unemployed 
workers.  As was the case under the earlier Bretton-Woods system, the United States 
provides  the “export market of last resort” (Eichengreen 2007, p. xi) for the new 
periphery, validating the export-led growth strategy of that group of countries. As was also 
the situation under the earlier regime, the reserve accumulation associated with the 
periphery’s foreign-exchange-market interventions allows the U.S. monetary authorities to 
neglect external factors in setting interest rates. 
In turn, rapid growth in Asia contributed to high oil prices, leading to high saving 
rates in oil-producing countries (mainly in the Middle East). In this connection, DFG 
(2005, p. 3) pointed-out that, during the first half of the 2000s, almost all of the increase in 
saving rates in the Asian and Middle-Eastern regions was matched by a fall in the saving 
rate of the United States. Moreover, almost all of the increase in the dollar value of saving 
in emerging Asia and the Middle East was placed in dollar-denominated  instruments, 
reflecting both growth strategies aimed at maintaining undervalued currencies (against the 
U.S. dollar) in those economies, the underdeveloped state of domestic financial systems in 
those regions, and the deep and broad U.S. financial system. 
The role of China figures prominently in the DFG analysis. That country faces the 
challenge of mobilizing an enormous pool of domestic savings  to create an 
internationally-competitive capital stock that can employ hundreds of millions of workers 
in productive activities (DFG, 2005, p. 1; Frankel, 2005, p.1). However, China lacks a 
domestic financial system and the managerial skills that can channel these savings in 
productive investment. To deal with this situation, China relies on export-led-growth to 
absorb millions of workers from its agricultural sector in its industrial-traded-goods sector. 
In turn, reserve accumulation by Asian and other central banks allowed the United States 
to rely on domestic demand to underpin its growth and finance its current-account deficits.    9 
In  DFG’s  view, reserve accumulation by China and other emerging-market 
economies can be thought of as collateral held against the stock of FDI in those 
economies.  The basic idea is that while financial intermediation by the United States 
facilitates growth in the periphery, it also generates asymmetric risks for the centre 
country since the periphery is less credit-worthy than the United States (DFG, 2004c, p.3). 
To offset these risks, the periphery must post collateral for actual and potential mark-to-
market losses. In DFG’s view, it is the goods and services already delivered to the United 
States that provide a hedge against the stock of direct investment claims held by that 
country. As stated by DFG (2004c, p. 3), “it follows that …the United States must be 
willing to run a current account deficit in order to fulfill its role as the centre country in 
the system.” In this total-return-swap, China gets the return on dollar-denominated 
financial instruments (mainly U.S. Treasury securities) and foreign investors get the return 
on equity. Thus, as under Bretton-Woods I,  the United States engages in maturity 
transformation, borrowing short-term, on net, from the periphery, and lending long-term, 
on net - - mainly in the form of FDI - - to the periphery. DFG have also argued that the old 
periphery - - consisting of Western Europe, Canada, Japan, and parts of Latin America - - 
interacts with the center with flexible exchange rates; its aggregate current account has 
been roughly in balance. As under the older system, the United States remains the centre 
country, pursuing a monetary-policy strategy that ignores the exchange rate. 
What are the implications of the global financial crisis that erupted in August 2007 
for the DFG thesis? DFG (2009) argued that global financial crisis was not caused by the 
global current-account imbalances since the crisis did not entail a sudden stop of capital 
flows to the United States, which would have led to a large depreciation of the U.S. dollar. 
To the contrary, they pointed out that the U.S. dollar appreciated against most major 
currencies during the crisis. In their view, “the crisis was caused by ineffective supervision 
and regulation of financial markets in the U.S. and other industrial countries” (DFG, 2009, 
p. 3). Consequently, DFG (2009) argued that the Bretton-Woods analogy continues to 
define the international monetary system. 
In sum, DFG identified a number of similarities between the international monetary 
regime of the 1950s and 1960s and the regime that has operated in recent years. (i) As was 
the case under the Bretton-Woods I regime, the present regime is comprised of a center 
country and a group of economies constituting a periphery. The center country has been 
the United States in both regimes. (ii) Under both regimes, there is asymmetric behavior,   10 
with the U.S. ignoring external factors in setting interest rates and the periphery paying 
close attention to external factors.  (iii)  Under both regimes, the periphery follows an 
export-led growth strategy based on undervalued currencies, pegged against the U.S. 
dollar  and supported by controls on capital flows.  (iv)  Under both regimes, the 
undervalued currencies give rise to a massive accumulation of foreign-exchange reserves 
mainly in the form of low-yielding U.S.-dollar-denominated financial instruments. (v) 
Under both regimes, the United States provides the main export market for the periphery, 
underpinning the periphery’s export-led growth strategy. (vi) As was the situation in the 
earlier regime, in the current regime, the United States serves as world banker, providing 
financial-intermediation services for the rest of the world. (vii) As was the case with the 
Bretton-Woods I regime, the present system will prove to be sustainable and 
metamorphic. At some point in time, “there will be… another wave of countries, as India 
is now doing, ready to graduate to the periphery” (DFG, 2004, p. 308). 
4.  Assessments of the DFG Thesis 
The idea that the international monetary system has evolved into a revived Bretton-
Woods regime has generated two (sometimes overlapping) strands of critical literature. 
One group of authors has accepted the general validity of the Bretton-Woods metaphor but 
also points to substantial differences from the earlier Bretton-Woods system. A second 
group of authors has challenged some of the key assumptions - - especially with regard to 
the central role of China - - underlying the revived Bretton-Woods story.  
a. Regimes Differences 
As noted, while accepting the general validity of the DFG thesis one group of critics 
of that thesis posits that the Bretton-Woods metaphor is incomplete because it overlooks 
crucial differences between the earlier and the revived Bretton-Woods regimes. These 
differences, according to this group of writers, will render the revived regime unstable. 
The key differences cited in the literature are as follows. 
1. External position of the United States. Eichengreen (2004, 2007) and Roubini 
(2006) pointed out that, unlike the situation under Bretton-Woods II in which the United 
States has been running large current account deficits and incurring a rapidly-expanding 
net foreign-debt position, the United States registered current-account surpluses through 
most of the period 1954-71 and was a net investor abroad. In addition, Roubini (2006, p.   11 
306) noted that, unlike the situation that emerged in the 2000s, U.S. fiscal deficits were 
relatively-modest under the Bretton-Woods I regime.  Consequently,  the above-cited 
authors have argued that the combination of large U.S. fiscal and external deficits will 
undermine the stability of the Bretton-Woods II regime so that, unlike the earlier regime, 
it will be short-lived (Roubini, 2006, p. 306; Eichengreen, 2007, pp. 27-28; see, also, 
Munchau, 2007). 
2. Accumulation of U.S. dollar liabilities. Closely related to the previous argument, 
some  authors have maintained that the magnitude of the financial  flows required to 
finance U.S. current-account deficits will increase at a faster rate than the willingness of 
the world’s central banks and global private investors to accumulate dollar reserves 
(Roubini and Sester, 2005; Roubini, 2006; Hunt, 2008; Sester, 2008; Bibow, 2010). In this 
connection, Roubini argued that the durability of the Bretton-Woods II system required a 
sustained, robust expansion of U.S. domestic demand to absorb the exports of the 
periphery. Roubini (2006) posited that expansionary fiscal and monetary policies in the 
United States needed to sustain an expansion of domestic demand were underpinning a 
housing-market bubble in that country; that author also predicted that the bubble would 
burst, leading to an economic showdown and driving the exchange-rate of the U.S. dollar 
downward. Wolf (2008) and Bibow (2010) argued that the large U.S. current-account 
deficits of the mid-2000s were unsustainable because a domestic counterpart of those 
deficits was a build-up of U.S. household debt, which was being  used to finance an 
unsustainable expansion of private consumption. 
3. The international role of the U.S. dollar. Several authors (Eichengreen, 2004, 
2007; Frankel, 2005; Munchau, 2007) stressed that during the 1950s and 1960s there was 
no major alternative to challenge the U.S. dollar as the key international currency; under 
the new regime, the dollar faces a strong alternative in the euro; therefore, unlike the 
situation that existed in the 1960s, the United States will not be able to supply unlimited 
dollar liquidity to the rest of the world without generating a run on the dollar. The 
knowledge that an excess supply of dollar liquidity could lead to a run on the dollar is said 
to act as a constraint on the behaviour of U.S. policy-makers, thereby differentiating the 
present regime from the earlier regime (Eichengreen, 2004; 2007). In addition, 
Eichengreen (2007, p. 6) argued that, under the earlier regime, the European countries that 
formed the periphery constituted a cohesive bloc; thus, those countries were “ready and   12 
able to act in their collective interest.” Under the new regime, in contrast, the countries of 
the Asian periphery tend to act in a heterogeneous fashion (Eichengreen, 2007, pp. 24-25). 
4. A key similarity 
Frankel (2005) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) presented a different argument from 
those above to support the view that the Bretton-Woods II regime would be unsustainable. 
In  this connection, Frankel noted that although the United States ran current-account 
surpluses in the 1960s, it nevertheless ran balance-of-payments deficits beginning in 1958. 
These deficits “defined the 1960s as a period of excess supply of dollars” (2005, p. 197), 
just as an excess supply of dollars marked the period that began in the early-2000s. It was 
this underlying similarity between the Bretton-Woods I and II regimes that, according to 
Frankel, would lead to the unraveling of the latter regime. Similarly, Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(2005) pointed to the parallels, in terms of the large U.S. twin deficits, between the periods 
marking the early-1970s and the mid-2000s to support their argument that the revived 
regime would not be sustainable. We develop this argument in the sections below. 
b. Is the Bretton-Woods Metaphor Valid? 
As mentioned, a second group of critics have questioned the validity of the Bretton-
Woods metaphor. The main arguments made by these critics are the following. 
1. The role of FDI. DFG pointed that the Bretton-Woods II regime provides China 
with a large flow of FDI, contributing to the build-up of a highly-efficient capital stock 
that would otherwise have been unattainable in that country because of inefficiencies and 
distortions in the domestic financial system. Goldstein and Lardy (2005a, 2005b) provided 
data showing that foreign investment in China funded less than five per cent of fixed-asset 
investment in that country in the early-to-mid-2000s - - “far too small a share to offset the 
misallocation of investment financed through China’s weak domestic banking system” 
(Goldstein and Lardy, 2005b, p.15). Those authors concluded that, in the absence of the 
efficient-capital-stock argument, the Bretton-Woods II thesis “is just another ill-informed 
employment-oriented case for exchange rate undervaluation” (Goldstein and Lardy, 
2005a, p. 11). 
2. Sterilisation. To maintain undervalued currencies against the U.S. dollar, China 
and other Asian emerging-market economies have engaged in sterilisation  operations. 
DFG argued that, in the case of China, this policy was feasible because the interest rate on 
its domestic debt was lower than the interest rate earned on U.S. government securities.   13 
Roubini (2004), Eichengreen (2004, 2007), Rajan and Subramanian (2004) and Goldstein 
and  Lardy (2004, 2007) have argued, however, that DFG underestimated the costs of 
sterilisation. Specifically, the former group of authors has  put forward the view that 
prolonged sterilisation will lead to financial repression, leading to depressed consumption 
and forced savings, inhibiting the efficient allocation of resources and undermining long-
term potential growth. In addition, Roubini (2005) argued that the enormous growth of 
reserves in the Asian periphery was becoming more difficult to sterilise, especially in 
China where the resulting increase in the money supply was fueling a lending boom and 
an asset-price bubble. 
3. Exchange-rate policy of the periphery. Goldstein and Lardy (2008) and Truman 
(2008) have argued that the exchange-rate policies of many Asian economies, including 
China, have been more flexible than assumed by DFG. Although the periphery has, for the 
most part, maintained undervalued exchange rates against the dollar, there is a marked 
difference between the exchange-rate regime used by the earlier periphery and the regime 
used by the new periphery. Specifically, unlike the adjustable-peg of the earlier Bretton-
Woods regime, which featured occasional  -  -  but large any  discrete adjustments in 
nominal exchange rates - - the revived regime resembles a crawling peg. That is, the 
revived regime combines elements of both the adjustable peg of the Bretton-Woods I 
regime and a more flexible exchange-rate arrangement. Consequently, it is not entirely 
accurate to describe the present regime as a revived Bretton-Woods regime (Goldstein and 
Lardy, 2008). 
Kamin (2005) agreed with  DFG that the authorities in the Asian periphery had 
maintained competitiveness of their exports by limiting the nominal appreciations of their 
currencies vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. However, that author attributed the current-account 
surpluses in that region mainly to special on-going effects related to the deadline in 
investment and domestic demand in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. 
Kamin (2005, p. 3) argued that “once these effects wane, the surpluses will wane as well 
(so that, over time, the revived Bretton-Woods regime would come to an end.  
c.   Asymmetric Behaviour 
Hall, Hondroyiannis, Swamy and Tavlas (2011) formally tested  whether (1) the 
United States, the centre country under both Bretton-Woods regimes, ignored external 
factors (proxied by the change in foreign exchange reserves divided by high-powered   14 
money) in formulating monetary policy (as proxied by short-term interest rates) in these 
regimes and (2) the periphery also ignored external factors in setting monetary policy 
under both regimes.
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5.  Asset-Price Bubbles and International Liquidity 
  The idea underlying this work was to test whether there was 
asymmetry between the behaviour of the centre country, which under the asymmetry 
hypothesis conducts monetary policy strictly on the basis of domestic objectives, and the 
periphery, which takes external factors into account in setting interest rates under the 
asymmetry hypothesis. The quarterly sample period used by the authors for the Bretton-
Woods I regime  was 1959:Q2-1971:Q4; for the Bretton-Woods II regime the sample 
period was 1998:Q1-2009:Q4. The countries assumed to comprise the periphery under the 
earlier periphery were France, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom. For the Bretton-
Woods II regime, the countries comprising the periphery were China, Hong Kong, Korea, 
Japan, Malaysia and Singapore. The results suggested that the United States did not take 
external factors into account in formulating monetary policy under both regimes, as 
stipulated under the asymmetry hypothesis. Under the Bretton-Woods I regime, most 
countries in the periphery were found to have taken external factors into account in setting 
interest rates. Under the revived regime, in contrast, most of the countries comprising the 
periphery did not take external factors into account in setting interest rates. An implication 
of these results is that the regime comprising the period from the late-1950s until the 
early-1970s differed from the regime marking the period from the late-1990s until 2007 in 
terms of the policy responses of the economies comprising the periphery. 
There are no precise empirical definitions of either an asset-price bubble or an asset-
price boom.
19
                                                 
18 The study by Hall et al. (2011) departed from most other work comparing the two Bretton-Woods regimes 
in that it used formal empirical testing. 
 Following Kindleberger (1993), an asset bubble can be loosely defined as a 
sharp rise in the price of an asset or a range of assets in a continuous process with the 
initial rises leading to self-fulfilling expectations of further increases. Effectively, 
speculators are interested mainly  in generating profits from trading in assets, not  the 
underlying risk-adjusted expected rate of return on the asset (Kindleberger, 1993, p. 243). 
The rise is typically followed by a sharp reversal in price, often resulting in a financial 
crisis.  Asset-prices booms are (loosely) differentiated from bubbles in that the price rise 
in the former tends to be milder and more extended than in the former and is less likely to 
19 Bordo and Wheelock (2004, 2007) used statistical algorithms to identify stock-market booms.   15 
lead to a crash. Commodities are an alternative (to such assets as stock-market shares and 
bonds) asset class that has  experienced rapid growth in both open positions at future 
exchanges and investments in commodity-indexed assets (Mongars and Marchal-Dombrat, 
2006;  IMF, 2008, p. 88).  In what follows, the relationship between global-liquidity 
creation and commodity-price booms is investigated. 
Our  thesis is that, to the extent that the Bretton-Woods metaphor is valid, the 
Bretton-Woods II regime is marked by an underlying bias in favor of excessive global 
liquidity creation that can lead to asset-price bubbles  as measured by changes in 
commodity prices.
20 In particular, the specific combination of (1) a large (in terms of 
economic size) periphery that maintains pegged, undervalued exchange rates, (2) a large 
hegemon, the currency of which is used by the periphery as the anchor for the peg, and, 
(3) the absence of a convertibility requirement on the hegemon, leads to a bias conducive 
to  “excessive”  global liquidity creation.
21  During most of the earlier Bretton-Woods 
regime, Federal Reserve monetary policy operated under a convertibility restraint - - that 
is, the requirement to sell gold to foreign central banks at a fixed price of $35 per ounce of 
gold. As noted above, however, in the late-1960s and early-1970s, as the constraint 
became binding, the U.S. loosened the constraint. As a result, under the latter stages of the 
Bretton-Woods I regime the absence of a convertibility requirement on the hegemon left it 
free to issue its fiat liabilities without a convertibility constraint. With the sharp increase in 
the  U.S. balance-of-payments deficits,  the issuance  of U.S. fiat liabilities swelled, 
contributing to a huge increase in global liquidity as non-U.S. central banks acquired 
dollar reserves in an effort to maintain their exchange-rate pegs against the dollar 
(Meltzer, 1991; Bordo, 1993).
 22
                                                 
20 In contrast to the situation in the 2000s, the sharp-rise in global liquidity during the late-1960s and early-
1970s did not lead to price bubbles for assets such as equities and real estate. During the late-1960s and 
early-1970s many developed countries, including the United States, maintained controls on cross-borders 
flows. These controls may have dampened the linkages between global liquidity and developments in 
domestic asset markets. In contrast to real estate and equities, commodity trading takes place on an 
international exchange (London). 
 
21  Clearly, there is no precise definition of “excessive” liquidity creation. In what follows, “excessive 
liquidity creation is (loosely) taken to mean a rate of increase in global liquidity that exceeds the rate of 
growth of nominal world GDP. 
22 Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009, p. 38) made a similar argument to the one above: “During the closing years of 
the Bretton-Woods system, speculation against the overvalued dollar contributed to worldwide growth in 
international reserves and eventually to higher global inflation. In the 2000s up until the autumn of 2008, 
reserve growth similarly caused inflationary pressures outside the U.S., also driving increases in commodity, 
housing and other asset prices”. Apart from that statement, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009) did not develop the 
Bretton-Woods I and II analogy.   16 
How does global liquidity affect asset prices? There are several channels through 
which an increase in liquidity may be associated with a rise in asset prices. First, an 
increase in liquidity tends to boost the demand for assets, such as government bonds, 
equities, commodity-indexed securities, and real estate, and, thereby, reduce the rates of 
returns on these instruments (Baks and Kramer, 1999, p. 5). If inflation in goods-and-
services prices is relatively low because of, for example, productivity growth, the prices of 
assets will rise in real terms (IMF, 2000, pp. 88-89). Second, according to the Austrian 
view of financial crisis, a rise in asset prices, whatever the cause, can lead to a bubble if 
monetary policy passively allows bank credit to expand, fueling the boom (Bordo and 
Wheelock, 2004, p. 20). The Austrian view associates rising asset prices and financial 
imbalances (including current-account imbalances) with general inflation regardless of 
developments in the prices of goods and services.
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Table 1 provides data on the annual growth rates of global reserves, global GDP 
(both real and nominal), and four categories of commodity prices - - (1) a comprehensive 
index at the prices of thirty commodities compiled by the European Central Bank, (2) the 
price of those commodities excluding gold and energy, (3) the price of energy, and (4) the 
price of gold. (Definitions and sources are provided in the Table.) Four sub-periods over 
the period 1960-2007 are considered: 1960-1969, 1970-1974, 1975-2002, and 2003-2007. 
The period 1970-1974, corresponds to the latter stages of the Bretton-Woods I regime 
(with an added year to capture lagged effects), a period marked by the severance of the 
convertibility link between the dollar and gold. The period 2003-2007 corresponds to the 
initial years of Bretton-Woods II regime.
  Third, in the specific case of 
commodities, economies, such as that of China, that maintain undervalued exchange rates 
to boost growth contribute to a price spike in two ways. (1) The increase in the demand for 
commodities as inputs into production leads, other things being the same, to higher prices 
of commodities. (2) In turn, the initial price increases can lead to expectations of further 
increases, making commodities more attractive as an investment vehicle. 
24
                                                 
23 See, for example, Borio and White (2003). 
 The starting point of the sample reflects the 
unavailability of data on the ECB’s commodity price series before 1960. The ending point 
of the sample corresponds to the year of the eruption of the global financial crisis. 
24 Since there is no official designation of a Bretton-Woods II regime in international law, there is no precise 
period that corresponds to the operation of the regime. This is no clear demarcation of either the latter stages 
of the earlier regime or the initial stages of the new regime.   17 
As reported in Table 1, reserves rose by an annual rate of 6.8 percent during 1960-
1969, but, following the break of the link to gold, the increase surged to an annual rate of 
30.5 percent in the period, 1970-1974. The growth rate of reserves declined to 9.7 percent 
during 1975-2002, but then again rose sharply, to 17.1 percent, during 2003-2007.
25
Why should the period, 1975-2001, have been marked by lower growth rate of 
reserves than the periods 1970-1974 and  2003-2007? After all, the gold-convertibility 
requirement was absent in all three periods. As noted, the earlier Bretton-Woods regime 
broke down in 1973, leaving most of the major currencies floating against the dollar. 
Effectively, most of world trade was conducted under floating exchange rates against the 
dollar. However, with the emergence of the revived Bretton-Woods regime in early-2000s, 
an increasing share of global trade was conducted under pegged rates against the dollar. 
Under the Bretton-Woods II regime, as under the earlier latter stages of the Bretton-
Woods regime, the trinity of (1) a large periphery that maintains pegged, undervalued 
exchange rates, (2) a large hegemon, the currency of which is used by the periphery as the 
anchor for the peg, and (3) the absence of a convertibility requirement on the currency of 
the hegemon, was operational, leaving the global financial system susceptible to a bias in 
favor of excessive liquidity creation. 
 
Commodity prices surged during both 1970-1974 and 2003-2007. As reported in 
Table 1, the composite price index of commodities rose by annualised averages of 33.9 
percent in 1969-1974  and by 21.5  percent in the period  2002-2007;  energy  prices 
increased by annualised averages of 56.2 percent in the former period and by 23.5 percent 
in the recent period. By comparison, during the period 1975-2002  the  price  index  of 
commodities declined by an annual average of 0.5 percent; the price of energy rose by an 
annual average of 5.7 percent during that period. The prices of gold and commodities 
excluding energy and gold followed similar patterns as those of the other commodity 
categories listed in Table 1. 
                                                 
25 The results of a time-series model for structural breaks, proposed by Salkever (1976), confirms that the 
behaviour of reserves was different in the periods 1970-74 and 2003-2007 than in the period 1975-2002. 
Letting xt equal the log of real reserves in period t , D1 be a shift dummy equal to unity during 1970-74, and 
D2 equal a shift dummy equal to unity during 2003-2007, the following results were obtained: 
2 1 2 1 036 . 0 035 . 0 07 . 0 07 . 1 043 . 0 D D x x x t t t + + − + = − −  
          (0.3)     (6.7)            (0.4)                (1.9)          (2.1) 
where t-ratios are in parenthesis. Combining the dummies into a single dummy gives a coefficient of 0.035 
with a t-ratio of 3.99. Note that the log of reserves is essentially a unit-root process, so that the average 
(quarter-on-quarter) growth of real reserves is about 4 per cent while in the two subperiods it is around 8 per 
cent.   18 
Several common factors were associated with the booms in commodity prices (IMF, 
2008, pp. 84-87). First, the initial phases of the booms coincided with accelerations in 
global economic growth (Radetski, 2006). Second, reflecting prior  periods of low 
commodity prices, both booms started with lower-than-usual spare productive capacity 
and inventory levels (IMF, 2008, p. 85). Third, supply constraints - - including weather-
related crop failures and the impact of the OPEC cartel - - influenced prices in both booms 
(IMF, 2008, p. 88). Finally, speculative activity involving the purchase of commodities 
intended for resale at higher prices rather than for commercial use drove up commodity 
prices during both booms.
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As mentioned above, the surges in commodity prices during both 1970-1974 and 
2003-2007 originated during periods of strong global growth. Nevertheless, the historical 
association between commodity booms and global growth is not always robust: (1) global 
growth turned sharply downward toward the end of 1973, but the boom in commodity 
prices continued for another year; and (2) long periods of sustained global economic 
growth during the 1980s and 1990s were not accompanied by broad-based commodity 
price booms involving fuel and food commodities (IMF, 2008, pp. 84-85). 
 
Are there additional factors that can explain the asset-price booms of 1970-1974 and 
2003-2007? As reported above, the sharp rises in commodity prices during both periods 
were associated with exceptionally-large increases in global liquidity. To  further 
investigate the relationship between commodity prices and global liquidity, the following 
regression was estimated: 
t t t IP a CPI s a a CPI CommP log )) / (Re (log )) / ( (log 2 1 0 ∆ + ∆ + = ∆     (1) 




(Res/CPI) is global reserve deflated by consumer prices, and   is industrial countries’ 
industrial production.
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26 For a discussion of the possible role of speculation driving up commodity prices, see IMF (2008, Chapter 
3). 
 Clearly, the above specification is over-simplified; other variables, 
including variables representing supply constraints and inventories, should be included, 
but data on such variables are not available for many commodities. The first-difference 
specification, however, helps deal with omitted-variable biases and produces stationarity 
of the variables. Separate regressions were estimated for four commodity groups: (1) an 
27  CPI CommP / can be viewed as the relative price of commodities.  
28 More details on the data definitions and sources of data are provided in Table 1.   19 
index  (used above)  of the prices of thirty  commodities, excluding gold; (2) the same 
index, but also excluding coal and oil; (3) an index of the prices of oil and coal; and (4) 
the price of gold. Regressions were estimated over the period 1970-2007. The data are 
annual. 
The results are reported in Table 2. In all equations, there is a strong procyclical 
effect of industrial production on commodity prices; however, in the regressions with both 
the changes in energy prices and gold prices as the dependent variable, the demand 
variable is not significant. The coefficient on the change in reserves variable is positive 
and significant in all regressions with a coefficient that is generally above unity; in 
general, the results suggest that a 1 percent increase in the growth of reserves increases the 




6. A Formal Test of Bubbles 
The main counterpart of the build-up of reserves during five years ending in 2007 
was the U.S. current-account deficits of that period (Table 3). Consider the following: 
•  U.S. current-account deficits averaged 5.4 percent of GDP during the five years 
ending in 2007, peaking at 6.0 percent in 2006. 
30
•  During that period, the cumulative total of the U.S. current-account deficits 
amounted to 2.68 trillion SDRs. 
 
•  The change in global reserves during the same period was 2.42 trillion SDRs, 
close to the cumulative U.S. current-account deficits during the period (Table 2). 
Global-reserve accumulation was underpinned by the accumulation of reserves by 
Asian emerging-market economies. Seven economies - - those of China, Hong Kong, 
India, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan - - accounted for over 45 percent of the 
build-up of global reserves during the five years ending in 2007 (Table 2).
31 The main 
drivers of reserve accumulation among the Asian emerging-market economies were the 
following: (i) an excess of domestic saving in some economies,
32
                                                 
29 We ran another set of regressions using world real GDP (from the World Bank databank) as the demand 
variable. The results are similar to those reported above. The results are available from the authors. 
 (ii) underdeveloped 
financial systems, so that there may have been difficulties in channeling saving to 
30 During the preceding 30 years U.S. current-account deficits averaged 1.5 percent of GDP.
 
31 DFG (2004a) included Japan, which they identify as an economy that manages its exchange rate against 
the dollar, as a member of the Bretton-Woods II periphery. Inclusion of the Japanese economy in that group 
increases share to sixty percent.  
32 Obstfeld and Rogoff (2008, p. 150) argued that, although an increase in global saving contributed to low 
global interest rates in the 2000s, a large rise in saving did not take place until 2004.   20 
domestic investment, (iii) the desire to unilaterally to self-insure against future crises in 
the aftermath of the financial crises that hit several emerging-market economies in the 
1990s and early 2000s, and, (iv) the pursuit of expert-led growth strategies supported by 
undervalued exchange rates, that is, the DFG thesis. 
There is neither a precise nor a unidirectional relationship among the foregoing 
developments. Instead, the developments were marked by interconnected feedback loops. 
(i) Low U.S. interest rates contributed to higher U.S. domestic demand, increasing the 
current-account deficit and contributing to higher U.S. asset prices. (ii) Higher U.S. asset 
prices led (through wealth and balance-sheet effects) to an increase in U.S. economic 
growth, raising the current-account deficit. In turn, a widening of the U.S. current-account 
deficit  may have pushed-up U.S. asset prices.
33  (iii)  The exchange-rate policy of the 
periphery, whereby the periphery accumulated reserves and invested in U.S. financial 
instruments, raised the prices of those instruments and fed the asset-price boom.
34
In what follows, we apply a formal test of a collapsing rational bubble, extending the 
technique of Hall, Psaradakis and Sola (1999), who proposed a switching Augmented-
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) type test to capture collapsing and expanding bubbles. The aim of 
the test is to asses whether the relationship between global liquidity and commodity prices 
differed fundamentally during the early 1970s and the 2000s from the other years in our 
sample. Specifically, we aim to determine whether the periods marking the early 1970s 
and the 2000s were characterised by commodity price-bubbles. 
 (iv) The 
exchange-rate policy of the periphery led to higher, export-led growth in the periphery, 
increasing the demand for commodities as inputs. To the extent that the counterpart of the 
periphery’s exports represented a rise in U.S. imports, the U.S. experienced a larger 
current-account deficit than it would have otherwise. Other things being equal, higher 
global commodity prices also widened the U.S. current-account deficit.  (v)  Higher 
commodity prices led to higher current-account surpluses for commodity exporters. Since 
many oil-exporting countries maintain dollar pegs, these surpluses resulted in higher 
global reserves and lower U.S. interest rates. 
                                                 
33 Aizenmann and Jinjarak (2009) estimated that an increase in the U.S. current-account deficit by 1 percent 
of GDP is associated with a ten percent rise in real estate prices. 
34 Estimates by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2008) and Warnock and Warnock (2009) suggest 
that official demand for U.S. sovereign debt decreased long-term rates on that debt by more than 50 basis 
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The basic idea is that we use an extension of a Markov switching model to view the 
world as consisting of two regimes, either an expanding bubble or a stationary (or at most 
an untrended unit root) process. To capture these regimes, we allow the parameters of our 
model to switch between two discreet states. The conventional Markov switching model 
assumes that the probabilities of either remaining in a regime or switching are constant 
parameters. Here, we extend the standard model in two ways. First, we make the transition 
probabilities functions of global liquidity so that (assuming that we obtain the correctly-
signed parameters) the probabilities change when liquidity is growing rapidly. Therefore, 
if we are in a bubble state and liquidity is growing at a relatively-high rate, we are more 
likely to remain in the bubble regime. Alternatively, if we are not in a bubble state, but 
liquidity is rising at a relatively-fast rate, we are more likely to switch into a bubble state. 
The second extension we make is to allow the probabilities to adjust gradually over time 
using a partial adjustment process. 
The basic framework for this test is an extension of the standard ADF test for non-
stationarity as follows 
t t t t t t t y s s s s y ε η η µ µ + + − + + − = ∆ −1 1 0 1 0 ) ) 1 ( ( ) 1 (       (2) 
where y is the log of commodity prices, s is an indicator of the regime  } 1 , 0 { ∈ t s  and  t ε  is 
an IID error process. Following Goldfeld and Quandt (1973) and Hamilton (1989) we 
would then set up a system under which the probability of being in regime s at time t is a 
function of the regime at t-1 and this is specified as a Markov chain on the state space with 
the following transition probabilities 






where p and q are constants, representing the probabilities of being in the two regimes. For 
example, equation (3) says that if we were in regime 1 last period, there is a probability, p, 
of being in that regime this period. In what follows, we generalise this model, making the 
evolution of p and q functions of a variable, in this case the rate of growth of global 
liquidity. Since p and q are probabilities, any function that generates these probabilities   22 
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must bound them to be between zero and one. The following parameterisation has been 
used: 




where α1 is the probability of remaining in the stable regime if liquidity growth is high; a 
negative coefficient on α1  indicates a high probability of switching to a bubble regime 
from the stable regime  if liquidity growth is high. Similarly, β1  is the probability of 
remaining in a bubble regime if liquidity growth is high; a positive coefficient indicates a 
high probability of remaining in the bubble regime.  The effect of ω  is to smooth sudden 
movements in the transition probabilities, while the effect of the growth in liquidity is to 
change the probabilities of switching into a bubble or remaining in a bubble through time. 
Thus,  when liquidity grows rapidly we would expect to see a significant shift in the 
probabilities so that if we are not in a bubble regime, we are more likely to switch to a 
bubble; correspondingly, if we are in a bubble regime, we are more likely to stay there. 
The key parameters  in terms of our hypothesis are  1 1 β α and , the coefficients  on the 
growth of liquidity in the two equations generating p and q. If the hypothesis that high 
liquidity growth (1) results in a regime switch from a stable regime to a bubble regime, 
and (2) leads to a high probability of remaining in a bubble regime, is correct, we would 
expect that  0 0 1 1 > < β α and  
We estimated the above model using maximum likelihood.  The  model is quite 
demanding of the data because we need a large number of observations for both regimes 
to allow us to successfully identify the regimes and the transition from one regime to the 
other.  In Section 4 above, we used annual data on liquidity and commodity prices; 
however, annual data provided an insufficient number of observations to  estimate  the 
above model. We have, therefore, used a monthly all-commodity price index, compiled by 
UNCTAD,  which is available from 1962 to mid 2010, providing us with over 500 
observations. Monthly data on global liquidity do not exist; therefore, the data on liquidity 
have been interpolated to a monthly frequency from the annual data used in earlier parts of 
this paper. 
The results from estimating this model are reported in Table 4. The  1 α coefficient is 
significant, which suggests that there is a significant effect of a change in liquidity on the   23 
probability of changing a regime. It is also negative, which means that it reduces the 
probability of remaining in the non-bubble regime and increases the chances of moving 
into the bubble regime. The  1 β   coefficient is positive, as hypothesised  but  is  not 
significant. Overall, the model works reasonably well, although some of the coefficients 
are not very significant. Regime 1 is virtually a unit root (since  1 η  is close to zero) while 
the other regime is more stationary.  
A  key  finding concerns the timing of the two regimes.  Figure  1  shows the 
probability of being in one regime or the other, where 1 indicates being in the more 
unstable (i. e., bubble) regime and 0 indicates the stable one. From the early 1960s, the 
model suggests that commodity markets were predominantly in a stable regime until the 
early 1970s, during which time, the model suggests the world moved into a largely 
unstable one, until 1975. From that point on, although there are some brief periods in 
which the commodity markets are unstable, the model is predominantly stable through late 
2002, at which point it switches mainly to the unstable regime for the rest of the decade. 
These episodes, then, match the dating of the original and revived Bretton-Woods periods 
remarkably well, strongly supporting our hypothesis that there was a qualitative difference 
in the relationship between global liquidity and  commodity prices during the periods 
corresponding to both  the latter stages of the earlier Bretton-Woods regime and the 
revived Bretton-Woods regime. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
The breakdown of the earlier Bretton-Woods regime ushered in a regime of managed 
floating exchange rates among the major currencies.
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35 The qualifier “managed” is added to account for the fact that there were significant departures from 
floating. For example, prior to the adoption of the euro in 1999, the currencies of many European economies 
operated under a target zone arrangement. 
  The  managed-floating regime 
withstood a series of shocks to the global economy - - including several oil-price shocks 
and crises in emerging-market economies. It encompassed much of the period marked by 
the Great Moderation - - that is, the long period of sustained U.S. economic growth and 
relatively-low U.S. inflation of the 1980s and 1990s. Although the United States ran 
persistent current-account deficits during the period from the breakdown of the earlier 
Bretton-Woods regime to the emergence of the revised Bretton-Woods regime, the size of   24 
the deficits was modest compared with those that emerged in the 2000s.
36
In this paper, we have extended the DFG revived Bretton-Woods metaphor. We 
interpreted sharp spikes of global liquidity creation and booms in commodity prices as 
recurrent features of an international monetary system marked by the trinity of (1) a large 
periphery that maintains pegged, undervalued exchange rates, (2) a large hegemon, the 
currency of which is used by the periphery as the anchor for the peg, and (3) the absence 
of a convertibility requirement on the currency of the hegemon. Operating in the absence 
of the self-adjusting features of floating exchange rates against the economies that form 
the periphery and the discipline imposed by a convertibility requirement, the hegemon 
pursues  domestic monetary policy unconstrained by its large current-account deficits, 
which are, in part, the result of a policy imposed by the periphery. Under the revived 
Bretton-Woods system the Fed has attained its inflation objective, but the interactions of 
its monetary policy, which essentially takes no account of external factors, and the policy 
of the periphery, have created a situation conducive to global imbalances, excessive global 
liquidity creation, and asset-price bubbles. 
  Floating 
exchange rates among most of the major currencies provide features on global imbalances. 
 
 
                                                 
36 As noted above, since there is no official designation of the Bretton-Woods II regime, there is no precise 
period that corresponds to the operation of that regime. During the period 1973-2002, U.S. current-account 
deficits averaged 1.4 percent of GDP, compared with 5.4 percent in the five years ending in 2007.   25 
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 Table 1 
Commodity Prices and International Reserves, 1969-2007 
Annualised percent changes 
 
 
  1960-1969  1970-1974  1975-2002  2003-2007 
Reserves  6.8  30.5  9.7  17.1 
Real GDP (world)  N/A  4.8  3.4  4.1 
Nominal GDP (world, U.S. 
dollars) 
7.5  13.8  7.1  9.7 
Commodities   0.9  33.9  2.6  21.5 
Commodities 
 (excluding gold and energy) 
1.4  20.9  0.1  17.9 
Energy  -0.5  56.2  5.7  23.5 
Gold  0.2  42.2  5.1  19.8 
 
 
Notes:  1. Reserves; the data are from the IMF’s International Financial  Statistics,  
      line 1ds; reserves are denominated in SDRs and exclude gold holdings  
2.  Nominal GDP (world) and real GDP (world) are from the World Bank     
online database, World databank 
3. Commodities, commodities excluding gold and energy, and energy are from  
    the European Central Bank database. The index for commodities is based on  
    the prices of 30 commodities. The energy component of the index consists  
    of the prices of coal and crude oil. 
4. The price of Gold is from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. It is  
    the spot price in U.S. dollars on the London market. 
   1 
Table 2 
































.31  1.23  8.5  7.7  21.8 









.42  1.30  5.6  6.8  2.1 








.22  1.61  2.1  2.9  54.6 








.14  1.40  3.5  7.0  3.6 
 
  Notes:  - Figures in parentheses are absolute values of Newey-West corrected t-ratios. 
    - All variables are in first differences of logarithms. Prices of commodities and reserves are each deflated by the  
  world price level as reported in the International Financial Statistics. 
- The data are annual. 
      - The estimation period is 1970-2007. 
    - Definitions of variables are provided in Table 1. 
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2003  -4.7  -372.4  265.5  60.6  -2.7  16.8  16.2  5.0  4.3  20.1   
2004  -5.3  -426.2  377.5  121.0  -0.1  14.9  23.8  12.9  7.7  16.7   
2005  -5.9  -506.8  581.2  179.1  7.4  11.7  19.0  6.5  8.8  21.5   
2006  -6.0  -546.2  455.4  135.5  1.6  21.2  11.6  5.9  9.3  -1.0   
2007  -5.2  474.7  745.1  258.1  6.1  55.5  7.1  9.3  12.5  -6.8   
Cumulative balance  -2,680.8  2,424.6  754.1  12.3  120.1  77.7  35.6  42.8  50.5  1,093.1 
 
   3 
Table 4 Parameter estimates of the switching Dickey-Fuller model 
  0 µ   1 µ   0 η   1 η   0 α   1 α   0 β   1 β  
coefficient  0.14  -0.013  -0.027  -0.003  5.3  -1.13  1.6  0.9 
t-ratio  2.0  0.9  1.84  0.8  5.3  2.3  1.5  0.9 
Note: In these results the parameterω has been restricted to 0.3.   4 
Figure 1 : The probability of each regime 
 
 